The agency was created as the Office of Civil Defense in 1951. In 1984, the OCD name was changed to the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency after the Waverly propane disaster.
In 2002, TEMA changed direction with the appointment of Major General (retired) James H. Bassham who previously commanded the Tennessee Air National Guard as the Assistant Adjutant General for Air. General Bassham was able to quietly turn the agency from a reactive organization into a proactive entity with plans for multiple courses of action.
TEMA was especially busy during 2003 coordinating responses to deadly tornadoes in Jackson, Tennessee and severe straight-line windstorms in Shelby and Fayette counties. In fact, each year has shown its potential for threatening weather with other serious tornado outbreaks occurring in 2006 and 2008. TEMA's coordination of emergency assistance and response continued as flooding and more severe weather resulted in disaster declarations in 75 counties across the state.
By 2004 TEMA had designated more than 30 emergency service coordinators (ESC) from all departments and agencies. In September 2006 the State Emergency Operations Center was reopened after a complete renovation that included computers, telephones, radios, offices, and other integrated systems costing over $4.7 million. Governor Phil Bredesen was present for a TEMA open house where three new communications trailers and a communications and command post bus were displayed to reflect the agency's new capabilities. In July 2006, an independent researcher at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill concluded that Tennessee, among three other states, stood out because of their successful emergency management web sites. This study was referenced in an article in the Spring 2007 volume of Emergency Management Magazine. Other articles began to appear in newspapers and magazines about TEMA's conditional accreditation by the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) of Lexington, Kentucky and about TEMA's ability to plan, to communicate, and to organize in a disaster. In August 2007, an Associated Press story reported that the Federal Emergency Management Agency had determined that Tennessee was one of only 10 states with plans capable of being executed immediately in a disaster. By December, TEMA had added three fulltime Emergency Services Coordinators from the Department of Safety, Department of Transportation, and Department of Environment and Conservation which dramatically enhanced emergency planning and operations response capabilities. Other planners and representatives were soon after provided by the Department of Health and the Department of Human Services.
On November 16, 2007, TEMA received a crowning achievement with the announcement that the Emergency Management Program of the State of Tennessee had achieved permanent national accreditation (5 year period) by EMAP. A marble plaque of recognition was presented to Governor Phil Bredesen and Director James Bassham in January of 2008. At the time, Tennessee was one of only 12 states that had achieved national accreditation at that time.
The 2000s began with a computer "time bomb" scare (Y2K) which ushered in a whole new set of threats that had almost been non-existent before. Viruses, worms and other computer, internet or e-mail net problems began to proliferate. Other threats began to appear which were previously dormant, for example, many dams were built on karst topology and began to show signs of erosion causing fears of failure, new viruses began to appear that challenged health personnel (West Nile, H5N1 avian flu and H1N1 swine flu), and the climate of the globe began to apparently warm up which caused significant weather trouble, including more thunderstorms and tornadoes, hurricanes and typhoons, flooding and droughts, ice storms, forest fires and wildfires and other extremes in weather temperature. For the first time, dikes holding back piles of coal ash failed causing hazards for homes near the break and potential environmental dangers. Other threats appeared due to the growth of programs that were previously much smaller, such as accidents from increased activity at the entire Oak Ridge reservation and an increase of transportation of environmental wastes from K-25, X-10 and Y-12. New issues arose requiring emergency management involvement in the near emergency conditions that occur in fuel and water shortages, in potential epidemics or pandemics and developing weather that could potentially produce a hurricane and cause evacuations.
During the 2000s Tennessee was the host of evacuees from Louisiana after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. Approximately 3000 people were housed in official shelters in both emergencies. Tornadoes and floods have continued to occur with increasing regularity along with an increase in hazardous materials incidents.
The 1990s brought with it the "reinvention of government." Perhaps no other agency was more suited to the "poster child" of this concept than FEMA. Upon his appointment as director, James Lee Witt set out to remodel the agency and to make it more attuned to the needs of the state and local governments. FEMA went from being the agency everyone liked to complain about to being one of the more responsive and capable agencies in the federal government - a complete, 180-degree turnaround from the 1992 Hurricane Andrew debacle.
Mr. Witt also changed the focus of emergency management so that hazard mitigation was now the foundation of emergency preparedness at all levels of government. Recognizing that it was pointless and costly to simply rebuild homes in areas that flooded every other year, his approach was to provide federal and state funds to buy out homeowners in these areas and turn them into parks, golf courses, and other facilities that, if flooded suffered little if any consequential loss. It was much cheaper in the long run, the theory is, to buy out and relocate a homeowner than to have to rebuild his home every other year. This mitigation cornerstone remains in place today.
Mr. Witt also streamlined the disaster assistance processes of FEMA so that now, when FEMA is called upon to provide temporary housing funds to disaster victims for example, it takes just a couple of days to get money to them. This stands in stark contrast to the 4-6 WEEKS it took just 8 years ago. FEMA has also shifted from requiring states to perform certain, specific things in exchange for the funding they receive from the agency, to a program that allows the state to decide which disasters and emergencies affect it most heavily, and develop a program that addresses those issues. This allows the states to concentrate on those types of situations it is most likely to encounter rather than those that are never likely to occur.
Tennessee, like many other states, began to see an increase in the number of major disasters that impacted it. Whereas the state had been averaging a major disaster declaration once every 18 months, the frequency of these events began to increase. Major ice and snow storms in 1993 and 1994, flooding in 1995 and 1997, severe weather in every year since 1995, and several lesser events made the latter half of the 1990s an extremely busy time for the agency. In 1994, the state's emergency management plan shifted from an "annex"-based, static document to one developed on the Emergency Support Function (ESF) developed by FEMA for its FRP. The state's new plan was concept-oriented and allowed for the flexibility needed to address the changing nature of disasters, and the flux that was involved in the day-to-day operations of state government itself. Tennessee was the first state to develop an ESF-based plan, and the plan was requested by several other states to inspect in the development of their own ESF-type planning documents.
Perhaps fittingly, the decade of the 90s closed out with the most prepared-for non event in history - the Y2K "glitch." There was a concern that many of the computer systems in the world that run everything from coffee makers to ATMs to the national defense mechanisms might not be able to interpret the last two zeros in a 2-digit date as the year 2000, instead believing it to be 1900. Thousands of "experts" flooded the media preaching gloom and doom and the end of the world or civilization as we knew it. Some people even bought houses way out in the backwoods, stocking them with huge quantities of rations just to be on the safe side in case anarchy ensued. Fortunately, through the dedicated work of thousands of computer professionals, little happened that required the attention of emergency services professionals. The State Emergency Operations Center was activated, however, staffed by about two dozen personnel just in case something did happen. Nothing did, of course, but the staff did enjoy watching the Y2K celebrations from around the globe.
The agency continues to focus on natural and common technological disasters. Today, however, the agency is also forced to focus on such things as domestic preparedness (counter-terrorism), critical infrastructure protection (protection of the state's transportation, utility, communications, financial, public health, and governmental systems) and a wide array of other threats that just ten years ago weren't even on the radar scope.
TEMA has always been recognized as one of the more proactive and well-managed state-level emergency management agencies in the country. Emergency services personnel come from all over the world to visit to see how we do things - Bulgarian and Russian delegations for example. It is our desire to continue that philosophy into the 21st Century.
With the creation of FEMA in 1979, the federal government consolidated several dozen emergency-related programs spread across a multitude of departments into a single entity. Its function was supposed to be the coordination of federal response to disasters and the provision of planning and programmatic assistance to state and local governments in the development of mechanisms to protect the civilian population from all threats. The consolidation of these programs, however, was only cosmetic in nature. Those personnel who had been associated with national security issues remained compartmented, and FEMA directors through the first Bush administration steered the agency toward "black" and "secret" national security programs such as continuity of government, relocation of executive branch personnel, etc. Response to civilian disasters and assistance to state and local governments took a back seat to these programs.
Those within FEMA's civilian programs, however, began to formulate a concept known as "Comprehensive Emergency Management" or CEM. CEM refers to the responsibility for managing response to all types of disasters and emergencies through the coordination of multiple agencies or entities. One of the concepts of CEM was the division of emergency activity into four "phases", specifically mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. These phases can be consistently applied across any type of disaster, whether it is man-made, natural, or even attack-related. The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) was also developed during this period. IEMS emphasized the application of "all-hazard" planning for responding to disasters, and FEMA began to allow state and local agencies to focus primarily on natural and technological disasters that affected their communities, and allowed them to relegate nuclear attack planning to the back burner.
In 1984, a methyl isocyante leak in Bophal, India, killed thousands of people and focused attention in the United States on what kinds of chemicals were being stored in local communities. As a result of the Bophal tragedy and several high-profile chemical events that occurred in the United States, the U. S. Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act in 1986 (SARA). SARA required any facility that manufactured, used, stored or processed certain kinds and quantities of chemicals to report information about them to local and state emergency officials, and this information was to be made available to the general public. This would allow community residents to know what kinds of chemicals were being used or stored near their homes, schools, and businesses.
Disasters, of course, continued to occur and began to attract much more intense media interest. Major hurricanes such as Hurricane Hugo and earthquakes such as those in Loma Prieta focused attention on the shortcomings in federal assistance to state and local governments. The overwhelming scope of these events focused attention on the need for a federal "response" role - a concept foreign to the recovery role that FEMA had long played. FEMA began work on a Federal Response Plan for a Catastrophic Earthquake in California. Over time this would evolve into a full-fledged, national government response plan known simply as the Federal Response Plan, or FRP. Unfortunately, the FRP had not been implemented prior to the landfall of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The federal response to this event, perhaps more than any other, focused attention on the need for FEMA to "reinvent" itself.
Tennessee, of course, followed the lead of the federal government in moving towards the all-hazard, integrated approach to emergency management. Programs were developed to assist local governments in developing emergency management plans and capabilities. This included a full-blown training program, and the development of the first, truly-integrated emergency plan for the state. This plan was known as the Tennessee Emergency Management Plan, or TEMP. The 1986 document became the basis for all emergency management plans and programs with the state and this remains the case today. A copy of the Introduction and Basic Plan for the 1986 document is available in the last frame of this section.
Following the Three Mile Island event, the nation's attention had been focused on preparedness for emergencies at nuclear plants. The implementation of NUREG 0654 by FEMA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission required states to prepare detailed emergency plans for events the nation's nuclear facilities. Tennessee was the first state to comply with the publishing of the Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (MJERP). The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant was operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority, and in order to acquire its license to operate, TVA had to work with the state and local governments to develop an off-site response capability that protected populations and farmland from radiological contamination. Every year since, TEMA and a wide array of state and local officials and volunteers have undertaken a major exercise to test the plan's effectiveness.
Tennessee was slow to adopt the "emergency management" moniker, however. It wasn't until 1984 that the name of the agency was officially changed to the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency. Also in 1984, TEMA got its first civilian director. The appointment of Lacy Suiter marked not only the first time a civilian headed the agency, but he also became the first internal employee to head the agency. Mr. Suiter started with the agency in the 1960s as an Operations Officer, and rose through the ranks to be appointed by Governor Lamar Alexander as the head of the agency. Mr. Suiter would go on to serve three governors (from both parties), and then became an Executive Associate Director of Response and Recovery at FEMA, following President Clinton's appointment of James Lee Witt as the Director of FEMA.
In the early 1970s, under intense pressure from Governors of the states and others who believed that the concept of separated civil defense and emergency preparedness functions was outdated, the federal level organizations moved toward allowing the dual-use of civil defense funds and equipment to be utilized for natural disaster preparedness. In 1971, the OCD was renamed to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), but retained its basic functions, and the OEP remained intact within the Executive Office of the President. DCPA continued to provide 50/50 matching funds for the "dual-use" concept of civil defense/emergency preparedness at the state and local level. The only visible change at DCPA was that their personnel would now assist state and local governments in developing plans for natural disaster as well as nuclear attacks. Despite the relatively peaceful relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S., the decision was made to maintain a modest civilian defense program. Reorganization Plan # 1, April 20, 1970 transferred the responsibility for the CONELRAD system to the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) within the EOP. CONELRAD was also renamed the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). OTP was later absorbed into the Office of Science and Technology Policy, also within the EOP (1978).
On July 1, 1973, Reorganization Plan # 2 took another step backward with the re-delegation of a wide variety of disaster and emergency preparedness activities amongst a tremendous number of disparate federal agencies. All coordination of federal agency response to major disasters was to be housed at the General Services Administration, specifically in the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA), and GSA would also create several other internal divisions for other functions related to emergency preparedness. All coordination of federal disaster relief activities was transferred to the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), where it was housed in the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. HUD also housed the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA), which had been created in 1968 to provide flood, riot and crime insurance (in the wake of the race riots of the late 1960s). The Defense Department maintained the DCPA in its original form, largely unchanged by the reorganization plan.
The Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 also created two additional emergency preparedness organizations within the Department of Commerce. The National Fire Prevention and Control Administration (NFPCA) was to assist states and localities in the development of fire prevention and control programs, while the National Academy of Fire Prevention and Control (NAFPC) was to develop model training programs for fire service personnel. NFPCA later became the United States Fire Administration in 1978 (still housed in DOC), and the NAFPC and would become the National Fire Academy in that same year.
The 1970s saw a dramatic rise in the number of emergencies and disasters that affected the country's states and localities. The increasing presence of hazardous materials in local communities and in the transportation corridors led to serious hazmat incidents. Chief among them were the Bromine release in Rockwood, TN, in 1977 and the LPG explosion in Waverly, Tennessee, in February of 1978. The years 1973-1975 saw dramatic increases in severe weather damages, especially in 1974, where hundreds of people were killed in a series of violent tornado outbreaks across the Midwest. Major flooding events impacted Tennessee in 1977, there were a couple of major dam failures, and the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant experienced a major malfunction. For a brief period of time, the federal government allowed the states to treat natural disaster preparedness as their primary role with respect to the use of federal civil defense funds. This changed again, however, following the ascendancy of Gerald Ford to the Presidency, and once again, states were required to treat planning for a nuclear attack as their primary function.
In 1979, President Jimmy Carter created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and consolidated several dozen, disparate emergency preparedness and civil defense functions into a single entity. Although that sounds efficient, many of these organizations continued to function as their own organization within the new agency, and for many years the "civil defense" and "national security" planners were distinct from those that assisted state and local governments in preparing for and responding to disasters. FEMA and its programs would become the basis for state and local emergency preparedness and civil defense programs for the next 20 years. Like most other states during the early and mid 1970s, the state of Tennessee also came to the realization that preparation for natural and now technological disasters should take priority over population relocations and sheltering surveys. Several of those disasters that attracted the attention of the nation occurred in Tennessee. The TCDA didn't wait until told that they could use funds for other purposes. In 1978, following the floods of 1977, and with the lingering after-effects of the tornadoes in 1974 and the Waverly explosion, the state developed its first "disaster response" document. With the release of the Tennessee Disaster Assistance Plan in 1978, the state now had a formalized process for responding to and recovering from disasters that affected the state. The plan had been under development for almost two years, and had been funded by a $250,000.00 grant from the FDAA (HUD), and was signed by Governor Ray Blanton in June of 1978. Governor Blanton had also issued an Executive Order (18) in 1975 designating the Tennessee Office of Civil Defense as the lead agency for coordinating the state's response to all disasters and emergencies that affected the state or its citizens.
Executive Order 18 also required that each state agency designate an Emergency Services Coordinator (ESC) and an alternate to serve as liaison to the TCDA during disasters and emergencies. Tennessee was the first state to formalize this process, and it allowed TCDA to reach into an agency to find someone who could assist a local community without having to call dozens of people in perhaps several different counties before they could arrange for help. TCDA could now contact this one person, explain to them what was needed, and that one person had the onus and the authority to find someone in his organization that could assist the local community with whatever it needed. The ESC concept continues to this day.
It was also during the late 1970s that TCDA found itself involved in several unique events. Among them was the funeral of Elvis Presley in Memphis in August of 1977. Presley had died unexpectedly, and there was a tremendous crowd presence that began to swell immediately following the announcement of his death. In the days that followed, more and more people surrounded his Graceland Mansion and clogged the roads in the area. With the advent of the funeral, Memphis officials feared that they would not be able to effectively control the traffic and the crowds, and asked for assistance from several state agencies, including the Tennessee Highway Patrol, the Tennessee Department of Transportation, and the Tennessee National Guard. The State Emergency Operations Center was activated and coordinate the provision of almost 1000 state personnel to assist the Memphis authorities.
National Guard involvement in the police and fire strikes in Memphis and in Nashville in 1978 also led to the activation of the state EOC. The SEOC coordinated the provision of troops, law enforcement personnel, and supplies to the city administration in both events.
Sadly, the 1978 explosion at Waverly also represents the only time that a TCDA/TEMA employee has been killed in the line of duty. Mark Belyew, a communications technician was providing radio communications coordination at a command post at the time of the LPG tank explosion in that city. The Planning and Communication Annex building on Houston Barracks is named in his honor. The agency's current director, John White, was also critically injured in that explosion. Coincidentally, the agency had developed a draft hazardous materials response plan prior to Waverly (in response to the Bromine leak in Rockwood), but had yet to enact it. The Planning and Communication Annex building on Houston Barracks is named in his honor.
Despite all of these developments, the general public at large had begun to grow weary of the "Duck and Cover" clips, and the occasional discussions about civil defense at local community group meetings. There was growing realization that an evacuation of major cities in the shadow of a nuclear attack was not feasible, so the primary emphasis continued to be centered around fallout shelters.
In 1961, however, President John F. Kennedy, sensing that the overwhelming majority of state and local governments were doing little if anything to develop a sheltering capability, decided to make civil defense preparedness once again a central issue. Kennedy once again separated out "civil defense" functions and other emergency preparedness functions into two agencies. Executive Order 10952 moved the CD functions into and Office of Civil Defense (OCD) within the Department of Defense, and assigned to the Secretary of Defense. A full-fledged nationwide shelter program, funded by the federal government was developed, resulting in engineering studies of existing structures, the acquisition and deployment of shelter stockpiles (i.e., the crackers and other goods one could find in the basements of these so-designated facilities). This moved "civilian" defense into the military arena, but it was widely believed that the Defense Department had the resources to undertake such a massive logistics program associated with the development of the sheltering program.
What remained of the emergency preparedness programs was transferred to a newly created Office of Emergency Planning (OEP), which became responsible for all civilian emergency preparedness activities, including resource utilization, disaster relief, economic stabilization, post-attack rehabilitation, and continuity of government functions. Still we have the separation of CD and other emergency functions at the federal level. In 1968, this office was renamed the Office of Emergency Preparedness. The Cuban Missile Crisis in late 1962 woke everyone up to the renewed possibility of a nuclear attack upon the United States. This incident served to bolster the Defense Department's budget requests for accelerated shelter program development, and this was reflected somewhat in the next budget. Once again, however, the following years would see a dearth of funding for such programs, especially given that with the removal of missiles from Cuba, and the newly developing war in Vietnam, there was once again little interest in the prospect of nuclear attack.
In August of 1966, the Tennessee Civil Defense Agency promulgated the Tennessee Plan for the Management of Resources. This plan was designed to formalize the manner in which critical resources would be managed by the federal, state and local government following a nuclear attack. In 1964, the federal OCD and OEP offices agreed to the framework for the management of the nation's critical resources following an attack - delegating the management of resources in the aftermath of such an attack. TCDA undertook an extensive review of the state's electrical and telecommunications assets, fuel supplies, food, industrial production assets, etc., and determined how they would be managed following a massive nuclear attack on the U.S., in conjunction with the federal management of nationwide resources. Governor Frank G. Clement signed an Executive Order [#28] on June 23, 1966, designating the Director of Civil Defense as the officer in charge of such coordination and planning efforts within Tennessee, and directed all other state agencies to coordinate their activities with the CD Director. Over the next several years, agency planners would set out developing lists of "critical facilities" that needed to be considered during planning for nuclear attacks and other emergencies that might involve resource shortages. Agency officials also coordinated the massive amounts of data related to the engineering studies and designation of shelters within Tennessee.
In 1967, the TCDA moved into its new emergency operations center, located at the Clement-Nunally Armory in south Nashville. This facility, housed on what is now called Houston Barracks, is the headquarters of the Tennessee Military Department, and the existing successor agency to TCDA still operates from there today.
On December 1, 1950, President Harry Truman created the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) [EO 10186] within what was called the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), attached to the Executive Office of the President. OEM's purpose up to that point had been largely to provide the President with a mechanism to monitor emergencies and disasters that affected the United States, and offered no direct assistance to state or local governments. Congress quickly picked up on this, and passed the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 [64 Stat. 1245]. On January 12, 1951, the FCDA was made an independent agency of the federal government, and absorbed the functions of what had been called the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). The NSRB had been created by the National Security Act of 1947, and was created to "advise the president on mobilization coordination of the United States" during times of war, specifically the buildup of industrial capabilities and the stockpiling of "critical" national security materiel. NSRB also laid the groundwork for the development of CONELRAD, the emergency warning system predecessor to the Emergency Broadcast System (and today, the Emergency Alert System).
On September 30, 1950, Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act, which was designed primarily to allow the federal government to provide some limited assistance to the states during times of disaster. This function was assigned to the Executive Office of the President (EOP), where it remained (in various incarnations) until 1973. The federal Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) was created by EO 10193, on December 16, 1950, to coordinate federal mobilization activities (initially for wartime activities), and ODM inherited the disaster relief coordination responsibilities in another EO , dated January 6, 1953. Another agency, the Defense Production Administration (DPA) was created by EO 10200, January 3, 1950, to exercise general control of the defense production program.
Confused? No doubt. So was just about everyone else at all levels of government during this period. The distinction between wartime-type civil defense activities and natural disaster relief activities and their attendant philosophies would serve to create friction in many different ways even through the 1980s. Civil defense workers were concerned with the protection of the civilian population from the effects of a hostile attack against the country, had "national security" status, and dealt with critical production issues, etc. Disaster relief was seen by CD workers as an unrelated, benign task best left to others.
In their original incarnation, Civil Defense programs sought to develop sheltering capabilities to house people in attacked cities. Civil defense planners, however, were also developing mass evacuation plans for supposed targets of the USSR. Planners naturally assumed that major cities, defense production facilities, major power plants, etc., would be targeted by the Russians in their attempt to take over the continental U. S., and sought to develop elaborate plans for the evacuations of populations from these areas. Detailed population and traffic routing studies were undertaken at all levels, including here in Tennessee, in an effort to determine how long it would take to evacuate a city such as Memphis for example. The entire population of the city of Memphis was to be relocated among some 30 counties in western Tennessee, eastern Arkansas, southeastern Missouri, and northern Mississippi. There were three main considerations that led planners to believe this would have been a viable option at the time:
All of these combined to suggest to evacuation planners that mass evacuations of large cities could be undertaken successfully in the event of a war with Russia. A great many people at all levels of government believed that such evacuations were not possible, and Congress refused to provide any substantial funding for any civil defense program, let alone funds needed for major relocation studies. A good deal of the funding went toward the development of sheltering programs, including the study of existing buildings for use as shelters, and the development of concepts and guidance for the building of underground shelters at individual homes.
In 1953, under Reorganization Plan # 3 (June 12), functions of the former NSRB were removed from FCDA, and along with programs of the existing ODM, FPA, and other disaster and emergency relief responsibilities of the EOP, were consolidated into a new Office of Defense Mobilization, housed within the Executive Office of the President. The FCDA would concentrate solely on preparing the civilian population for a nuclear attack, while the new ODM would assume all responsibilities related to domestic emergency preparedness and development of the nation's civilian capability to ramp up and go to war. The CONELRAD program was transferred to a newly created office called the Assistant Director of Telecommunications, who was to be a part of the new ODM.
During the 1953-1958 time period, there continued to be arguments over whether evacuation or sheltering was to be the nation's policy regarding response to a nuclear attack. There was vigorous debate in Congress, in the Executive Branch, and even among individuals charged with the responsibility of managing the civil defense and ODM programs. The general public had largely grown tired of civil defense anyway, however, due to the political face put on by the Eisenhower Administration about maintaining a peaceful coexistence with the Russians. That would soon change, however. The development of intercontinental ballistic missile capability and the subsequent launch of the Sputnik satellite, along with the Soviet Union's explosion of a hydrogen bomb once again fueled fears of the potential for a Russian attack on the United States. This time, however, the evacuation planners had to confront the fact that a Soviet missile could reach the U. S. in a few minutes, and that we may not have "several hours" to carry out an evacuation.
In 1958, the major civil defense and emergency preparedness programs at the federal level were reorganized. Under Reorganization Plan # 1 [July 1, 1958], the FCDA and the ODM were consolidated into a single agency, the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM), which was to be housed in the Executive Office of the President. It was during this period that the Federal Civil Defense Act was amended to allow the federal government to provide funding for civil emergency preparedness. The federal government would provide 50/50 matching funds to personnel and administration costs for agencies engaged in civil defense preparedness. The concept of a joint federal-state-local responsibility for civil defense and attack preparedness was also articulated in guidance distributed by the new ODCM.
Within Tennessee, the newly created Civil Defense Agency was hard at work in its headquarters office, located in Room 315 of the Cordell Hull Building. Based on direction and guidance from the FCDA, TCDA set out to develop massive evacuation plans for the major population centers in the state, Memphis, Nashville, Chattanooga, Tri-Cities, and Alkor (Knoxville-Alcoa). The Governor adopted the policy that TCDA should be the central coordination point for all civil defense actions following an attack, and gave TCDA the authority to coordinate all the other state agencies' activities during such periods.
The culmination of this effort led to the publishing in 1958 of the state's first major planning document related to civil defense. Called the Tennessee Operational Survivability Plan, the 10-volume document laid out how the state would respond to a nuclear attack in excruciating detail. The plan called for each of the population centers to be designated a Civil Defense Operational Area (CDOA), each with its own command structure. The Governor and the Civil Defense staff were to be relocated to a facility outside of Tullahoma, Tennessee, and an alternate state Capitol was to be established at the old Ovoca Children's School in the same general area. The plan describes vehicle loads for anticipated evacuation routes, contains letters of coordination for the use of counties in adjoining states, and even details specific guidance on how resources were to be allocated to individual counties through the CDOA organizational structure.
Severe thunderstorms and tornadoes swept the western and middle counties of the State of Tennessee on April 30th through May 3rd, 2010. These storms dropped hurricane-like record amounts of rain on 53 or more counties. There were at least 12 tornadoes reported in the storm system, significant amounts of lightning, strong straight line winds and flash flooding. The amounts of rain appeared to match hurricane-level rainfall.
In a drama that was recorded live by a local television station a modular classroom floated off its foundation and drifted down Interstate 24 near Bell Road, sinking cars and disintegrating in a culvert near Mill Creek. Fortunately, the center divider held back the 3-4 feet of water from sweeping escaping drivers and people in shock standing on the opposite side of the flooded roadbed. Not far from there a person was carried away in the current and drowned.
In West Tennessee, 14 to 22 inches of rain fell, and in Middle Tennessee, between 6 and 16 inches of rain fell. Record amounts caused major streams to near flood level or to crest above flood level. The Cumberland River overflowed its banks in Nashville and in Clarksville inundating broad areas. In Nashville water covered First and Second Avenue and damaged businesses on the opposite side of the river, including LP Stadium, Opryland Hotel, the Opry House and Opry Mills Shopping Center.
The State Emergency Operations Center was activated on May 1, 2010 at 1230 CDT. The SEOC was advanced to activation level 2, major disaster, but later fell to Level 4 when the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Joint Field Office (JFO) opened on May 17th. This level describes recovery operations in the JFO on a 7 am to 7 pm core work period with no night shift.
The flooding and storms caused the deaths of 24 persons: These deaths were mostly caused by water – 11 in Davidson County (although one was subsequently ruled natural by the medical examiner), 2 in Perry County, 2 in Stewart County, 1 in Carroll County, 1 in Williamson County, 1 in Shelby County, 1 in Gibson County, 1 in Hickman County, 1 in Montgomery County, 1 in Tipton County, 1 in Maury County and 1 (tornado related) in Hardeman County.
There were several close calls in the disaster that could have made the situation worse. A train with nearly 500 passengers was stranded due to water over the tracks. At one point a loaded grain barge floated free on the Cumberland requiring the U.S. Coast Guard to send out a tug to capture it before it could crash into a bridge or a dam. There was a possibility that some large petroleum storage tanks would float free of their foundation and release fuel into the Cumberland. There was a fear that the levee on the downtown side of the river could fail and flood the businesses and communications centers in Metro Center. There was a danger that the Omohundro water treatment plant would fail leaving Metro Nashville with no clean water source. There was even a concern with the U.S. Corps of Engineers regarding whether it was safer to release water downstream risking more flooding or risking the safety of the dams by over-topping. Response teams did a great job, often without anyone realizing the value of their work, saving their communities from even greater calamities.
The Tennessee National Guard activated almost 500 soldiers to perform support duties, including delivery of bottled water to many communities whose water systems were shut down or contaminated. Almost 450,000 gallons of water went to 10 counties.
The State Emergency Operations Center received well over 800 missions in two weeks of response. This compares to just over 100 missions received in the January 2010 Ice Storm.
The JFO is located in Nashville at the eastern side of Hickory Hollow Mall (Antioch) in the former J.C. Penney store. The JFO oversees the recovery phase of the disaster. This phase is notable for property damage assessment, determination of costs, application for disaster assistance and the provision of federal disaster assistance funds to individuals and governments.
The Logistics Support Area in Lavinia and Smyrna Logistics Support Area were operated by the Tennessee Army National Guard and sent bottled water to many counties: Benton, 62 pallets; Cheatham, 154; Clay, 10; Davidson, 2,766; Decatur, 8; DeKalb, 5; Gibson, 22; Hickman, 387; Perry, 43; and Stewart, 3. This is a total of just almost 3,500 pallets of water shipped. A full pallet of water is approximately 150 gallons.
The President has approved the following counties in a disaster declaration, bringing the total counties approved to 48. The list includes Benton, Campbell, Cannon, Carroll, Cheatham, Chester, Clay, Crockett, Davidson, Decatur, DeKalb, Dickson, Dyer, Fayette, Gibson, Giles, Hardeman, Hardin, Haywood, Henderson, Henry, Hickman, Houston, Humphreys, Jackson, Lauderdale, Lawrence, Lewis, Macon, Madison, Marshall, Maury, McNairy, Montgomery, Perry, Pickett, Robertson, Rutherford, Obion, Shelby, Smith, Stewart, Sumner, Tipton, Trousdale, Wayne, Williamson and Wilson. A total of 52 counties were initially requested for the federal disaster declaration to which 4 more were added.
Ms. Gracia Szczech is the Federal Coordinating Officer who heads the FEMA JFO.
APRIL 13, 2010 - EAST TENNESSEE Rockslides - Economic Disaster
A new proclamation by the Governor was announced on April 9, 2010 due to a rockslide on US Highway 129 in Blount County and US Highway 441 in Sevier County. The economic impact of these closures has a dramatic effect on the communities in Tennessee. These rockslides are in addition to the those that have already closed some highways. On January 19, rock and debris slid onto US 64 at mile marker 10.9 near Maddens Branch in Polk County. The roadway was already closed due to another rockslide that happened November 10, 2009 at mile marker 17.6 at TVA Ocoee Dam No. 2. On February 9 another proclamation was issued to recognize the severe strains being placed on residents near Ducktown due to a slide. The proclamations are a technical step in a process to obtain federal emergency relief funds to pay for the clean-up of the rockslides. The emergency precedes receipt of Small Business Administration assistance and other potential assistance from the U.S. Department of Transportation.
JUNE 20, 2006 - SWEETWATER Train Derailment
A Norfolk-Southern Railroad train consisting of 84 cars, including 2 tanker cars carrying liquid propane gas, partially derailed 21 cars in dense fog at approximately 1:30 am on Tuesday, June 20, 2006, between Sweetwater and Philadelphia, Tennessee. Also derailed were four other tank cars, one carrying methyl methacrylate, one carrying propylene oxide, one carrying carbon dioxide and one empty tank car with methyl chloride residue. The derailment occurred near the intersection of Highway 11 and Fish Hatchery Road just 2 miles north of the Sweetwater city limits.
Emergency responders were more concerned since liquid propane is flammable and highly explosive, methyl methacrylate is flammable and toxic, propylene oxide is flammable and potentially an explosion hazard and carbon dioxide is a frostbite and suffocation hazard for handlers or responders. Methyl chloride could be a flammable and toxic hazard, even though one car contained only residue. The accident was handled well, and there were no leaks or spills in the derailment. HEPACO, Incorporated of Charlotte, North Carolina and Hulcher Services of Denton, Texas were contracted to provide a safe off-load. The Tennessee Highway Patrol provided a helicopter for aerial survey.
The Incident Commander (IC) was Monroe County Sheriff Doug Watson. The incident command post was set up in the Memorial Gardens Cemetery on Highway 11 due to space and proximity. In a perfect example of teamwork the Sweetwater Police Chief and the Monroe County Emergency Management Director supported the incident in a classic NIMS/MACS effort. The Tennessee Highway Patrol sent a supervisor and two troopers for security, while the Tennessee Department of Transportation provided rail transportation liaisons. A HAZMAT team from Blount County Emergency Management Agency was standing by at the ICP. The IC Public Information Officer was a volunteer who provided information from the scene for release from the SEOC in Nashville.
The IC evacuated all persons within a half mile radius and by noon some 65 men, women and children were sheltered at Sweetwater High School. Several businesses are also included within the evacuation area. The ICP coordinated with the Sweetwater Hospitial for any person who wanted to speak to a person at the shelter.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) provided a team to investigate the accident.
Some rail cars were remounted on the rails, but for safety the two propane cars were off-loaded before attempting a remount of the rails. The accident scene was cleaned up in 24 hours, except for the butane car which took longer due to the need for a special railcar tanker.
This incident is a classic example of the Tennessee Incident Management System at work, a great job by the emergency responders.
D. Smith, EAO, TEMA
June 21, 2006
FEBRUARY 22, 1978 - WAVERLY, TENNESSEE Train Derailment, Hazardous Material and Explosion
[NOTE: There are mistakes in some publications regarding this accident, including errors in the number of people killed and injured, the number of rail cars involved, the propane explosion magnitude and even the date of the accident. For example, in the Federal Register, Vol. 62, Number 159, August 18, 1997, the accident date is recorded as “1973,” an incorrect year (correct date being February 22, 1978) that has been compounded throughout the country and the world by references. The summary below is a revision of the official version which itself once had some inaccuracies, such as the name of the railroad! The report is made more accurate by incorporating footnotes.]
Modern emergency response tactics were drastically changed when a train derailed in Waverly, Tennessee killing 16 persons and injuring 43, some with horribly severe burns. (Vanderbilt University/CBS Evening News) The derailment happened at 10:30 on the night of February 22, 1978, but the explosions actually occurred two days later. According to one source, the blast(s) followed “a series of poor decisions by railroad officials and public safety commanders that indicated a profound ignorance of the immense risks the responders faced” (Crichlow). It is true that technical education and safe tactical procedures across all responding organizations had not been fully instituted by that time, but the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators complimented the Town of Waverly for its coordination of the response. (NTSB) Since then, “the fire service and other public safety services have … reconfigured their response to emergencies” (Crichlow).
A westbound Louisville and Nashville (L&N) freight train was pulling through Waverly, the county seat of Humphreys County, a small town of approximately 5,000 persons (TEMA), when a brake shoe became overheated and caused a high carbon train wheel to break (De la Cruz). The wheel broke on the 17th car of the 92-car train, which caused the car to jump off the track and to pull 23 other cars off the tracks, including 2 Liquid Propane Gasoline (LPG) cars, each of 30,000 gallons size (TEMA). The derailment was not far from the center of town (TEMA).
The initial responders were the Waverly Police Department and the Waverly Fire Department. When the first responders reported to the scene, no one knew what they were facing (DGI). They arrived without gas detection devices, but found the LPG tank cars in the wreckage, one actually under other rail cars. They relied on visual observation (at night) to decide that there were no leaks and made an incorrect assumption that the cars were double-walled (TEMA). As a routine precaution, they determined to evacuate a nearby home and a custodial care unit, and at the instructions of the fire chief notified the Tennessee Office of Civil Defense (TOCD). They thought there were no hazardous materials involved and reported that information (TEMA).
By 5:10 on Thursday morning though, the report was changed and a state HAZMAT team was dispatched led by West Region Director Ron Collins. The team arrived within two hours and agreed that the fire department was correct to set up master streams on the tanks to keep them cool if the day began to warm up. Additional evacuations were ordered in a one quarter mile radius, and electrical and natural gas service to the area was shut off (TEMA).
Later that morning L&N crews began to arrive to begin clearing the debris and to reopen the tracks. Temperatures had been in the 20’s and had not warmed very much during the day. There was about a half inch of snow still on the ground. A cable sling was placed around the weakened LPG car under other cars, and it was pulled 12 feet east to remove it from the tracks, a job finished by 2:15 pm.
The line was reopened to limited traffic by 8:00 pm that evening, and L&N requested a team to off-load the LPG from the two derailed tank cars (TEMA). At around 1:00 pm on Friday, February 24th, a semi-trailer and tanker truck arrived with an experienced supervisor and crew to start the offload process. The crew went to lunch and the removal was to begin when they returned. This day saw clear skies and a lot of sunshine and temperatures quickly rose to the mid-50’s.
The crew returned from lunch and tested for leaks with gas detection equipment. No leaks were discovered from either tank car (TEMA).
By mid-afternoon on Friday, the off-loading crew had started to move its equipment into place to begin the process. On the scene were the Waverly Fire Chief and a fire crew, the Waverly Police Chief, and the two-man TOCD HAZMAT Team (TEMA).
At approximately 2:58 pm, vapor was observed leaking from one of the tank cars. Almost immediately a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) occurred (TEMA). The damaged tank could apparently no longer stand the increasing pressure from the sunshine on the tanker (Burke). An explosion immediately killed six persons and eliminated the on-scene firefighting capability. The Waverly fire chief (Wilbur York) was one of these.
A minute later, a seriously injured TOCD HAZMAT Team member (John White) radioed the TOCD office to report the explosion and to report that his team mate (Mark Belyew) was missing (TEMA).
Seventeen minutes after the BLEVE, the entire LPG tank car exploded (Vanderbilt University/CBS Evening News). The car was nearly full containing 28,000 gallons of LPG. (OHMS) This explosion propelled debris and parts of the tanker in several different directions. Sixteen buildings and multiple vehicles were totally destroyed in the flames as were many persons who had not left the area and 20 other buildings were partially engulfed or damaged (TEMA). Ten more people would eventually die, including the Waverly Police Chief (Guy Barnett) (TEMA).
“When liquid propane is released into the atmosphere, it quickly vaporizes into its normal state and forms ignitable fuel-air mixtures.” This vapor cloud burns very rapidly, “characterized by some experts as explosive” (Federal Register). The explosion and fires in the surrounding area resulted in over $1.8 million worth of property damage (Estabrooks).
For the next several hours, over 250 emergency vehicles from 39 counties poured into Waverly to assist in putting out fires and caring for the injured. The number of injured eventually totaled 43 people.
An evacuation out to a one mile radius was ordered in case the second tank car exploded.
The Tennessee Army National Guard sent support personnel and opened the armory for use as a shelter. (TEMA) At 7:00 pm that evening all of the fires had been contained and mutual aid units were sent home. Local officials began an extensive search for casualties which then had to be called off due to poor visibility. The search resumed the next morning at 5:30.
Burn victims were transported to Nashville for stabilization and then on to Louisville, Birmingham and Cincinnati by February 25th (TEMA).
At 3:15 pm on Saturday a rail car loaded with paper products reignited and burst into flames, but it was quickly put out. Transfer of the second LPG rail car began and was completed by 10:30 pm. The newly loaded car was taken to Jackson, its original destination.
Residents were allowed to return to their homes on the morning of the 26th and the armory shelter was closed by noon (TEMA).
The Waverly disaster was the turning point for emergency response disasters in reducing risks to responders. New techniques were introduced for firefighters after the NTSB investigation was completed (Benner). Governor Ray Blanton, in response to the identified shortcomings, ordered the creation of the Tennessee Hazardous Materials Institute and charged TEMA with providing instruction and validation of skills. TEMA developed standards and a training program for hazardous materials responders in the state which became a model for the nation.
The Tennessee General Assembly soon passed sweeping legislation to create one of the strongest emergency management laws in the nation, “Disasters, Emergencies and Civil Defense” (TCA 58-2-101 to TCA 58-2-124) and established the all new Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, retiring the old Office of Civil Defense.
John White became director of TEMA in 1994 and served until his retirement in 2003. A new Communications Annex in Nashville was named for Mark Belyew as a tribute for his service to the citizens of Tennessee.
Prepared by Donnie K. Smith
Executive Administration Officer
Tennessee Emergency Management Agency
(present in Waverly when the explosion occurred
as Admin. Asst. to the Adjutant General,
Department of Military)
WORKS CITED PAGE
Benner, Ludwig, Jr., “The Story of GEBMO (General Hazardous Materials Behavior Model),” 2001, NTSB Investigator article updated, February 2, 2007.
Burke, Robert, “Weyauwega Wisconsin Propane Fire,” HAZMAT Zone, Firehouse.com, July, 1996.
Crichlow, Douglas, “Taking a Comprehensive Approach to Handling Disasters, American City and County Magazine, Prism Business Media, Inc., Atlanta, GA, June 1, 1997
De la Cruz, Bonna, “Edwards has Represented Big as Well as Little Guys,” The Tennessean, http://www.tennessean.com/government/archives/04/07/53958158.shtml?Element_ID=53958158 July 8, 2004.
DGI Daily (Dangerous Goods International), www.dgitraining.com, Yukon, OK, September 23, 2003.
Estabrooks, Bates, “Real Transport Safety Issues,” email@example.com,” November 19, 2001.
Federal Register, Volume 62, Number 159, Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HM-225), 49 CFR Part 171, Office of Hazardous Materials Technology, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, August 18, 1997.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigation, NTSB-RAR-79-1, February 8, 1979.
Office of Hazardous Material Safety (OHMS), Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), http://hazmat.dot.gov/regs/rules/final/97 2133.htm.
Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA), “The Waverly Explosion,” tnema.org, February 22, 1978.
Vanderbilt University/CBS Evening News, Television News Archive, Morton Dean and Martha Teichner, “Train Derailments / Florida / Tennessee,” openweb.tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/1978-2/1978-02-27-ABC-3.html, Sunday, February 26, 1978.
DECEMBER 9, 1911 - BRICEVILLE, TENNESSEE - Cross Mountain Coal Mine Explosion
“An explosion and toxic gases (afterdamp) formed from it caused the death of 84 men and boys in a coal mine in Anderson County, Tennessee. Five men were rescued. The Cross Mountain Mine Disaster was the 36th worst in the history of mining in the United States. When [compared to] the Fraterville Mine Disaster, Coal Creek is the third worst mine disaster site in the history of mining in the United States.” (Coal Creek Watershed Foundation, History of the Coal Creek Watershed, “Cross Mountain Mine Disaster of 1911.”) Mouth-breathing self-rescuer equipment, demonstrated at Cross Mountain, became standard equipment for miners after that.
“Briceville, Tenn., Dec. 11 – “Five men had been brought alive from the Cross Mountain mine at 11 o’clock tonight, and rescuers at that time were making almost frantic efforts to reach at least three more whom they believe still are alive.
“These men had been prisoners in the workings since Saturday morning, when an explosion entombed more than 100 men….Immediately after the explosion they rushed to Cross Entry 19, where they quickly threw up a brattice that kept out the black damp which killed many of their fellow workmen. They took their lunch pails with them and the three subsisted for three days and two nights upon what they expected to make their Saturday noon meal….
“The rescuers are encountering great obstacles in penetrating the cross sections and it is feared that even should more be alive in the far recesses of the working it will be impossible to reach them before they starve.
“Mayor Thomas Watts of Coal Creek, five miles from Briceville, issued today an appeal to Mayors of all cities for financial aid for the mine sufferers. His appeal reads:
There are about 125 families in Briceville suffering from the Cross Mountain coal mine disaster. Help in funds is greatly needed, and we appeal to all American citizens to help us…
“A local Red Cross camp began work for the relief of the suffering this forenoon. It is estimated the explosion rendered 56 women widows and made 184 children orphans.
“Many theories are advanced as to the cause of the accident. [Mine President] Stephenson said it probably had been caused by a shot [intentional mining blast] which ignited gases accumulated in one of the many rooms in the mine or might have set off the coal dust on the floor…” (New York Times. “Find 5 Men Alive in Wrecked Mine – Workers Entombed at Briceville, Tenn., by Saturday’s Explosion Were Not Hurt,” December 12, 1911 (Tuesday)
DECEMBER 16, 1811 - MARCH 25,1812 - WEST TENNESSEE, Major Earthquakes
A HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF
Donnie K. Smith, TEMA
October 15, 2007
A HISTORICAL SUMMARY
New Madrid Earthquakes
The New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) extends southward 150 miles from Cairo, Illinois down the Mississippi River to Dyersburg, Tennessee. Today this area includes the metropolitan populations of St. Louis and Memphis. Along the line is a series of geological rifts running through the Mississippi River Valley. These rifts are in the middle of a geological plate, not on the edge where most earthquakes occur. In 1811 a “bubble” began to rise near the frontier town of New Madrid, Missouri not far north of Tiptonville, Tennessee. When it burst the pressure was not fully relieved for years. The earthquakes came in heavy waves, and there were a lot of them. It is difficult today to imagine the catastrophic effects, but there were nearly 2,000 quakes from November 16, 1811 to March 15, 1812. 13
The Richter Scale will be used where possible in this report since it is more accurate; however, it was not available in the 1800’s.1 When the Modified Mercalli Scale is used, the magnitude will be preceded with an “M.” (See Appendix 1.) The Mercalli scale suggests that the New Madrid earthquakes were larger than the 9.2 Richter Scale magnitude quake in Alaska in 1968, but there can be no certainty. Some scientists say the quakes did not exceed 8.0 Richter magnitude, 21 but from the collected damage reports it is likely that the shocks were greater than that. There will probably never be a definitive answer since events became confused by many witnesses over time and blended together. Some witnesses were not careful in delineating the events on the proper date. Other witnesses were in shock, were victims of exposure, or were not educated and were at a loss to understand what was going on. Many people ascribed the events to a comet or to “the end of the world.”13
The catastrophe is more difficult to imagine since it actually involved thousands of emergencies of differing degree occurring simultaneously over many months. For ease of understanding, most authorities divide the New Madrid disaster into three catastrophic peaks. 5
FIRST SHOCK WAVE
December 16, 1811
There was no known advance warning of the first quake for settlers, river travelers, or Indians in the NMSZ. Probably, no one knew about a flash of greenish-white light which had crossed over the sky in Southern Canada and disappeared a month earlier on November 16th. It was too far away to warn them, but the phenomenon is now recognized as electrostatic sparks caused from the friction of fast moving rock grains. While most people in the area were asleep, the cataclysm began at 2:15 in the early morning of December 16, 1811. The severity of the initial shock was awful (M-8.1 to M-9), but it was the first of some 40 strong quakes to occur before the end of the next day. Houses danced and chimneys fell. There were heavy rumblings and loud thunder; there were loud hollow and vibrating noises; there were violent wind noises; and there were sudden explosions of water. Fissures appeared in the ground everywhere so that not an acre existed without a crack; ejections of mud, water, sand and stone coal or lignite were thrown into the air some 90-100 feet, a process called earthquake dewatering,16 and in some places whole trees were thrown in the air. There was riverbed disruption in the Mississippi with lifting and falling water, waterfalls and rapids, and along the sides of the river large waterspouts jumped from the ground. Explosive cratering caused a thick and heavy fog filled with sulphurous vapor to hang in the air and the atmosphere was choked with dust and smoke for a week, an ugly haze through which the sun shone as reddish-bronze. Many places were almost entirely deluged by the river while other areas emptied of water. Once the initial shock took place repetitions of heavy earthquakes rolled every 15 minutes to an hour for five days. 13
The first shock was so huge that 1200 miles away in Southern Canada4 a fierce grinding sound was felt and a shuddering or jarring of the bones and setting the teeth on edge was felt just 15 minutes after the shock at New Madrid. Even in Canada creek banks caved in, trees toppled, and the waters of Lake Michigan and Lake Erie danced. The shake caused great waves to break onto shore although there was no wind.
Tremendous boulders broke loose, rapidly running streams stopped and eddied while some went dry, other streams were created where there were none before, and ponds appeared in various places.24
In the Indiana Territory and parts of Kentucky settlers were thrown from their beds, timbers of their cabins were wrenched apart, bricks crumbled, cliff sides slipped and fell into ravines, and bridges snapped and tumbled into rivers and creeks. 22 Forty-five minutes after the shock at the epicenter, houses shook in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Norfolk, Virginia causing the residents to wake and run out of bed. Bells in church towers rang in Philadelphia and tremors were felt in Washington, DC, but in Richmond, Virginia, the concussion was so violent that clocks stopped and suspended things oscillated violently. Savannah, Georgia experienced a meteoric flash of light followed by a rattling noise. Tremors also reached New Orleans, Louisiana; Savannah, Georgia; Detroit, Michigan; some parts of new England; and parts of Quebec.13
In New Madrid the day started out with Indian Summer temperatures of around 45 degrees, but the temperatures began to fall and by the third week of January, the Ohio River had frozen over.13 When the 11th shock came, the pulverized earth gave way at the river and the whole town went under water.13 For 150 miles up and down the river, sulphurated gases blasted and tainted the air and so strongly impregnated the water that for days it could hardly be used.7 The entire New Madrid population of men, women, and children lost any homes they still had standing. It was at that time that most of them gave up on staying and began walking barefoot and naked away from the area even though they had collected no food or money and very few other belongings. The lower temperatures simply made life more miserable for the survivors. 13
Downriver of Little Prairie, Missouri, tremendous volumes of ground water were squeezed out by liquefaction which in turn drained into the river and caused a rapid rise in water level and a swifter current than normal. The falling of the riverbanks into the stream, in some places as much as 30-40 acres at a time, caused a terrific rush of water to the other side of the river and may have contributed to the perception at this time that the river was running backwards. Only in one place below New Madrid did the lifting of the riverbed cause the river to run backwards for a short distance. The retrograde current was terrible, but it was nothing like the colossal and violent rebound velocity. On the return, trees that had sunk and mired into the silt on the river’s bottom were suddenly thrust loose and were tossed or floated to the top clogging the river and even jamming passage in the narrower parts. Other trees were thrown from the banks into the river. The broad stream was a frantic mess and a navigation nightmare. Boatmen were obliged at terrific speeds to ride the crest of a churning morass. Much of the land over 30,000 square miles had lowered by 6-15 feet and at the same time other areas were raised by that height. Vertical displacement of 3-6 feet was the norm, and there were places where the lateral displacement was up to 30 feet. Some locations had a range of magnitude so horrifying and “off the scale” that it is difficult to imagine what happened over the epicenter. 13
At 5:00 am on the 17th another horrendous shock blasted the area (M-7.1) interspersed with lesser ones. Another series of strong shocks occurred at 11:30 am, and succeeding quakes never really stopped; they just decreased in intensity. 16 Over the next 6 days there were over 100 shocks. 13
New Madrid, near the epicenter, was pounded. It had become the Gateway to the Mississippi and seemed to be growing into the “St. Louis” of its time. It was a thriving location for riverboats and fur traders as a layover on the way down the Mississippi River to Memphis and New Orleans. The founder, George Morgan, intended the area to be the source of goods for the King of Spain, so to encourage the crown to support the concept, the town was named after the Spanish capitol. In 1811 New Madrid boasted a population of some 4000 persons. It was an impressive site for the times, and it was built on banks some 26 feet above the waterline which appeared to be high enough to prevent flooding (this proved to be wrong). By 1817 though, it was obvious that the course of history had been irrevocably changed for the city. No one would stop at New Madrid after the earthquakes. The earthquakes had made an impression too deep and devastating on the people. They were unashamedly afraid of the area. 13
The quakes continued unabated through December and January, often with large ones interspersed. On one day, December 22, 1811, Louisville, Kentucky had 3 critical shocks, 2 severe, 3 serious and 79 others of various types. A large shock at 2 am on December 23rd surprised the town of Big Prairie, Missouri and totally destroyed it. At the same time, all the houses in Little Prairie near present day Caruthersville were “thrown down” as well. By the 12th of January Louisville had registered another critical shock and 150 tremors. On January 19th, all on the same day, Louisville received 65 more tremors. 13
The ice cracked in the river with tremors at Annapolis, Maryland at 9:44 pm on January 22nd panicking skaters. Not only that, but clocks stopped, and the state house steeple scarily swayed back and forth 6 to 8 feet. At 11:00 pm that night, Baltimore, Maryland reported lightning and sounds similar to a hot iron in snow. 13
SECOND SHOCK WAVE
January 23, 1812
New Madrid caught it again at 8:15 am on January 23, 1812 with a M-7.8 quake and another at 9:00 am. Although the intensity was slightly less, these earthquakes were just as violent as the earlier quakes. 20 The ground warped, ejections occurred, fissures were created, and severe landslides caved off stream banks. This set of quakes also broke up the ice jam in Louisville. Communities as far away as New York reported shakes. Long Island discovered hanging objects swinging back and forth. Cincinnati had a severe shock. Richmond reported doors and windows flapping, chairs rocking, and furniture moving back and forth. Charleston reported a shock, vibrations, cracked pavement, walls and plaster. The vibrations and shakes continued through the next day. On January 26th Louisville received 1 most severe quake, 1 severe quake, 7 serious quakes and 82 others. 13
At 9 am on January 27th New Madrid received another heavy shock. A tremor was felt in Montreal, Canada on January 30th. On February 2nd, Louisville received 1 most severe shock, 4 serious, and 204 other tremors. Washington, DC reported a minor quake on February 4th, the same day as New Madrid’s next heavy shock. On February 4th New York reported rumbling and short intervals of giddiness. 13
THIRD SHOCK WAVE
February 7, 1812
Usually, aftershocks are less intense than the first shock, but this cataclysm was different. The final explosion was of even greater magnitude than anything before. 13 The quake was estimated to be M-8.0 to M-11 and two more huge shocks followed it.13 There were loud heavy cannon noises and a violent agitation. 7 There were numerous shocks every few minutes, some heavy, but the following evening just after sunset New Madrid received another heavier shock which was followed by nine more25 The ground failure that resulted from these earthquakes was severe, in fact among the largest in the world. The earth rolled in waves a few feet in height and the swells burst into geysers spreading sand over large areas. The ground pushed up huge dike widths of several yards and opened up fissure lengths from 100 yards to miles. 7 The river banks gave way, sank and geysers shot up throwing trees 100 feet in the air, many falling back to be replanted in the ground. In some places where there was no liquid, 10-15 feet high columns of pulverized carbon filled the atmosphere with an acrid dust. More sand volcanoes erupted and black showers fell back to earth along with the white sand after a loud whistling and roaring disorder. 25 In one location, the Pennicot River was diverted through a fissure. 7 The water turned black as coal dust.13 Then, the land began sinking, trees began falling in from the bank again, and the banks themselves were caving in. The ground motion created tsunami-like effects that swamped boats, and fresh water liquefaction caused an immense rush of water into the river from the woods in one place. 7 Elastic rebound accounted for subsidence of several meters to return to pre-earthquake levels in many places, but one island (number 94) was sunk along with a band of river pirates.24 The quake disrupted the riverbed again, causing as much as 30 feet slip displacement and 12 feet drop which created a waterfall or rapids on the Kentucky Bend and the Bend’s western limb (described as two dreadful waterfalls with a great suction equal to the rapids in the Ohio River), with the river falling in a 23 feet descent over 2 miles. Another falls developed to the south and created several whirls with considerable “suck.” Two flow barriers were created at the same time. Meanwhile, a large river seiche was produced upstream of the New Madrid Bend area 7 caused by the rise of the riverbed 7-10 miles north of New Madrid. This retrograde current was matched downstream a kilometer from New Madrid where the riverbed also lifted several yards. In both of these locations, the Mississippi River flowed backwards and created a turbulent wave in the opposite direction.13 The shocks on February 7th caused as much damage as all of the previous ones combined.23
Events similar to those in December were repeated in Northeastern Arkansas when the riverbed lifted at 2:15 am near Tiptonville Dome. There, the river temporarily reversed course, an effect that was exacerbated by the banks falling in.13 Witnesses saw acres of riverbank crash into the channel in huge columns which raised swells 7-8 feet high. These waves rose up high like a wall and beat furiously on the riverbanks. When the undulations or land swells burst, they threw up water, sand and charcoal covered with sulphur. The earth was covered with holes that resembled craters of volcanoes, some 30 feet in diameter, encircled with rings of white sand in the black topsoil and more carbonized wood or coal.10 The damage and the “felt” areas in the Mississippi Valley were 100 times greater than those in western North America (i.e., California and Nevada).15 Magnitudes in the St. Francis River area exceeded M-10 and entered the M-11 range. Magnitude in the White River area and for Mississippi River Islands 30-40 was M-10. Elsewhere, northeastern Arkansas generally experienced magnitude M-11.13
New Madrid was finished at 3:45 am, with the area dropping nearly 14 feet.23 The town was then totally flooded, even though the water later receded. No matter, no one came back for years. Over the succeeding days, the earth continued to slowly subside until the spring floods swallowed the town once more. Reelfoot’s scarp was permanently uplifted, and after subsidence near Tiptonville of 5 to 20 feet, water began to rush into the area to create Reelfoot Lake. At the same time, the earthquake created Lake Isom to the immediate south, now a national wildlife refuge area. Arkansas experienced a 5 to 8 feet drop at Lake St. Francis in the eastern part of the state, and water levels rose by 25-30 feet there.13
The colossal quake rang church bells in Boston and a rumble was felt in Washington, DC. Houses were severely damaged in St. Louis, and chimney tops fell down in Cincinnati. Chimneys fell and treetops were much agitated in Richmond, and a severe shock was felt in Augusta, breaking glass in the windows of homes. 13
Between February 8th and February 12th, every 15-20 minutes, there were continuous shocks and rumbling in the New Madrid area. There were frequent eruptions of sand, stone, coal and water, craters 12-50 feet across and 5-10 feet down to the water. Several rapids were created in the Mississippi—one set 7 miles below New Madrid and according to one testimony more dangerous than the previous ones. 13
On February 9th, Louisville reported 180 more earthquakes, of which 3 were most severe, 5 severe and 7 serious. At the same time during one of the severe shocks, clocks stopped, brick buildings were cracked, and furniture was agitated in Savannah, Georgia. Another large quake was felt in New Madrid on February 10th and Savannah experienced undulation of the earth and a severe and tremendous quake. Another one occurred on February 11th at New Madrid. By February 16th Louisville had reported 86 more quakes, of which 3 were serious and 6 moderate or jarring. Richmond received a shock at dawn on February 18th. New York was hit by very violent shocks and flashes of light at 4 am on February 21st followed by a slighter shock. On February 23rd Louisville received 292 quakes, 4 in the serious category. On February 26th at 2:15 am Little Prairie, Missouri was permanently destroyed, leaving only the rubble to bounce in later shocks. No one came back.13
Although the worst was over by the end of February, it should not be assumed that everything was totally calm. Earthquakes continued off and on each day for months. On March 1st, Louisville reported on that single day 139 quakes, 1 of which was serious and 4 moderate. On March 8th, there were 58 more, of which 2 were serious and 9 moderate. On March 15th there were 221 quakes, of which 2 were serious and 3 moderate quakes. 13
On March 25th newspapers in Lexington, Kentucky published, in what may have been a comprehensive damage report, that a road to the port of Arkansas by Spring River had been completely destroyed, that chasms of great depth and length had appeared, that swamps had become dry and others had become deep lakes, and that hills had disappeared. 13
The next day, though, the Lexington Clarion Ledger reported 10,000 residents had been killed by an earthquake in Caracus and La Guaira, Venezuela. The number was later revised to be 20,000 killed.3
New Madrid had been pounded certainly with 1,874 shocks in a 3 month period, but the actual number was likely over 2,000. Only the quakes felt in Louisville, Kentucky were being counted. 13
After the horrid months of December 1811 to March 1812, large aftershocks continued with less frequency until 1817. 6 The area somewhat settled down after that, registering only one serious shock at New Madrid on January 4, 1843, estimated to be a 6.3 magnitude and fifty two years later, another one in Charleston, South Carolina on October 31, 1895, estimated to be a 6.6 or 6.7 on the Richter scale21. An earthquake between Charleston, Mississippi and Batesville, Mississippi knocked over chimneys and bookcases and was felt in Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee and Missouri.2 Another quake registering 5.5 magnitude shook New Madrid on October 21, 1965. A 5.4 magnitude earthquake toppled tombstones and cracked foundations in southeastern Illinois on November 9, 1968. 8 The last tremor registered at New Madrid was a 2.6 magnitude on September 3, 2007. 21
The NMSZ is really an anomaly and scientists still debate about it. Most earthquakes occur at the edge of seismic plates, but the NMSZ is actually in the middle of a plate! “We don’t know why we have earthquakes at New Madrid,” says Bob Hermann, Professor of Geophysics, at St. Louis University.14 Stanford geophysicist Mark Zoback, though, believes an old glacier is at the source of the problem. Twenty thousand years ago, the glacial ice sheet crept as far south as the middle of Illinois, but it was “big enough and thick enough” to strain the Earth several hundred miles to the south. He explains that “at the edge of the glacier, the Earth bent like a mattress will slope under a body’s weight,” and this effect almost broke the plate through. Now that the Earth’s climate is warmer and the glacier has melted, the earth is rebounding and will continue to do so for the next 10,000 years. This rebounding effect is what causes the earthquakes.5
Surprisingly, the NMSZ earthquakes were more intense that earthquakes elsewhere. Seismologist David Stewart reported that during these quakes, the damage spread over 15-20 states. He found that ground in the east reacted differently to earthquakes than those in the west. When the ground shakes in the east, he said, the potential for destruction and loss of life is greater.17 The ground at New Madrid is older, colder and more rigid and spreads the effects of an earthquake well.5 In fact, all eastern geology is older and simpler with fewer faults to slow quake waves. The ground is drier and propagates waves more efficiently.17
Many scientists think we have more earthquakes due in the NMSZ.9 There is repetitive evidence of current seismic activity and more recent studies have shown a history of disasters in this geologic area. Each successive tremor could be the precursor for the next cataclysm. Even if another earthquake in this area is less powerful by a magnitude of one or two below that in 1811-1812, the huge population now present in the NMSZ will present us a disaster no longer totaling just a few hundred persons.2 The next New Madrid earthquakes could easily become the new “worst disaster in history.
EARTHQUAKE MAGNITUDE SCALES
There are two scales by which to measure the magnitude of earthquakes, both of which are referenced in this report. They are the Modified Mercalli Scale, invented in 1902-03 by Giuseppi Mercalli6 and the Richter Scale, developed in 1934-35 by Charles F. Richter. 1
The Richter Scale, which depends entirely on seismographic instruments, is used by scientists today since it is the most accurate means of determining earthquake magnitude and intensity. Each point on the Richter scale is roughly a tenfold (10 times) the previous level in amplitude; however, the next point on the scale in energy is 31-32 times more than the preceding whole number. 6 There is no upper limit on the Richter Scale, but there are no recorded earthquakes greater than ten.20
The Modified Mercalli Scale is used for the 1811-1812 series of earthquakes since the Richter Scale had not yet been invented. The Mercalli is less scientific since it depends upon eye witness reports.11 The Modified Mercalli Scale is shown below1:
1. About.Com, Inc., “Charles Richter—the Richter Magnitude Scale,” The New York Times Company, http://inventors.about.com/od/qrstartinventors/a/Charles_Richter.htm,2007.
2. American Museum of Natural History, “When Disaster Strikes,” Young Naturalist Awards of 1999, subparagraph, “New Madrid Fault Line,” undated.
3. Clarion Ledger “Fault Zone Poses $3B Threat to Mississippi, Old Miss Study Says,” www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040726/news01/407260349/1002, Lexington, Kentucky, July 26, 2004.
4. Coggins, Allen R. “Earthquakes 1811-12“, Reelfoot Outdoors, The Tennessee Historical Society, www.reelfoot.com/ new_madrid_earthquake. htm.
5. Dalton, Louisa Stanford University, Stanford News Service, Mark Swartz News Service, www.standford.edu/ dept/news/pr/01/glacier37.html, March 7, 2001.
6. Fort Collins Emergency Management Agency, Fort Collins, Colorado, “The Modified Mercalli Scale,” http://www.ci.fort-collins.co.us/oem/modified-mercalli.php, 1996-2007.
7. Fuller, Myron L. “The New Madrid Earthquake,” US Geological Survey Bulletin 494, 1912.
8. Kinerny, Butch “New USGS Map Highlights Central U.S. Earthquake History,” Science Daily , www.sciencedaily.com/ releases/2004/04/040412014909.htm, April 1, 2004.
9. Logsdon, David R. I Was There! In the New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811-12, Kettle Mills Press, Nashville, 1990
10. Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, “The Day the Mississippi Ran Backward,” Internet address, www.sema.state.mo.us/backward.htm, (undated).
11. Nevada Seismological Laboratory, “What is Richter Magnitude?” www.seismo.unr.edu/ ftp/pub/louie/class/100/ magnitude.html, February 4, 2005.
12. Nuttli, Otto W. “The Mississippi Valley Earthquakes of 1811 and 1812,” Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Volume 63:1, February 1973.
13. Penick, James L., Jr. The New Madrid Earthquakes, University of Missouri
Press, Columbia and London, 1981
14. Rekenthaler, Doug “The Big One: Looking Ahead to the Next New Madrid Earthquake,” www.disasterrelief.org/ Disasters/980624newmadrid/, sub-paragraph, “Looking to the Past for Clues to New Madrid Enigma,” October 8, 2004.
15. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Monday, November 11, 1968, Volume 117, No. 115, page 3A.
16. Schmidt, Laurie J. “Squeezing Water from Rock,” Earth Observatory, NASA Earth Science Enterprise Data and Services, Langley Atmospheric Sciences Data Center (DAAC), www.earthobservatory.nasa.gov/ Study/Earthquake, Features, June 25, 2003.
17. Smith, Donald “Still Waiting for the Big One on the Mississippi,” National Geographic, www.nationalgeographic.com/ news/2000/12/1222 _newmadrid.html, Dec 22, 2000.
18. Stover, Carl W. and “Seismicity of the U. S. 1568-1989 (revised), U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 1527,
Jerry L. Coffman U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1993
19. Street, Robert “A Contribution to the Documentation of the 1811-1812 Mississippi Valley Earthquake Sequence, Part I,” 1980, Department of Geology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, Earthquake Notes, Vol. 53, No.2, April-June 1982.
20. State Emergency Management Agency Website, State of Missouri, www.sema/state/mo/ ready.html, undated.
21. United States Geological Survey, Earthquake Hazards Program, “Magnitude
and Intensity,” www.neic.cr.usgs.gov/neis/general/magnitude_intensity.html,
U.S. Department of the Interior, USGS, November 8, 2004.
22. United States Geological Survey, www.neic.cr.usgs.gov/ neis/eq_depot/usa/ 1811-1812.html, (undated).
23. Wood, Michele M. “Earthquake Magnitude Classes,” Michigan Technological University, UPSeis, Geological and Mining Engineering and Sciences Department, www.geo.mtu.edu/ upseis/magnitude.html, December 15, 2004.
24. Yarrow, David “Panther Across the Sky: Tecumseh and the New Madrid Earthquake, December, 1811,” by Chief Luther Standing Bear (1933),licon Graphics, www.ratical.com/ ratville/Tecumseh.html, June 25, 1995.
25. Gold, Thomas “Earthquakes, Gases, and Earthquake Prediction,” CU People, www.people.cornell.edu / pages/tg21/Earthq.html, , Cornell University, 1994.
26. Patterson, Gary “Your Fault, My Fault, and the New Madrid Fault,”
Center for Earthquake Research and Information,
www.rockhoundingar.com/geology/fault.html, October 1998
27. Metzger, Ann G. and “Earthquake Risk in the New Madrid Seismic Zone,”
Jill Stevens Johnston University of Memphis, www.rockhoundingar.com/
geology/fault.html., October 1998